jueves, 10 de octubre de 2013
miércoles, 9 de octubre de 2013
Hedonismo Gastronómico
Pleasure as a Right
“Pleasure is a human right because it is physiological; we cannot fail to feel pleasure when we eat.” Thus claims Carlo Petrini on page 50 of his Slow Food Nation (2007), while arguing for the importance of the hedonistic dimension of eating. Petrini’s position, which is exemplar ofgastronomic hedonism, stands in direct opposition to gastronomic purism. Let’s see why that’s the case.
Hedonism
“Pleasure is a human right because it is physiological; we cannot fail to feel pleasure when we eat.” Thus claims Carlo Petrini on page 50 of his Slow Food Nation (2007), while arguing for the importance of the hedonistic dimension of eating. Petrini’s position, which is exemplar ofgastronomic hedonism, stands in direct opposition to gastronomic purism. Let’s see why that’s the case.
Hedonism
Hedonism has a bad reputation in most quarters and, with some reflection, it is even hard to understand why that is the case. After all, what is hedonism? It’s just the principle of conduct according to which the motivation for action is pleasure. Don’t you think that pleasure, rather than sheer duty, is often part of your reasons for undertaking an action? If you are hesitant on how you would answer this question, try and see if you don’t actually catch yourself in some hedonistic behavior.
Hedonism should not be confused with egoism, according to which the motivation for action ispersonal pleasure. While personal pleasure may motivate some actions, it need not be at the root of any action; or, at least, so one could think, although several Utilitarianists would have objected to it.
Hedonism should not be confused with egoism, according to which the motivation for action ispersonal pleasure. While personal pleasure may motivate some actions, it need not be at the root of any action; or, at least, so one could think, although several Utilitarianists would have objected to it.
Gastronomic Hedonism
From hedonism we can define its gastronomic declination: gastronomic hedonism is the principle of conduct according to which the motivations for nourishment are the pleasures derived from eating. Sensory pleasures to the front of the line, although they may not be the sole kind of relevant pleasures (Epicurus had already taught about this long ago). As Petrini remarks, indeed, the pleasure we get from eating is first and foremost tied to our physiology.
We can devise also an egoistic variant of gastronomic hedonism, according to which the motivations for nourishment are the personal pleasures derived from eating.
From hedonism we can define its gastronomic declination: gastronomic hedonism is the principle of conduct according to which the motivations for nourishment are the pleasures derived from eating. Sensory pleasures to the front of the line, although they may not be the sole kind of relevant pleasures (Epicurus had already taught about this long ago). As Petrini remarks, indeed, the pleasure we get from eating is first and foremost tied to our physiology.
We can devise also an egoistic variant of gastronomic hedonism, according to which the motivations for nourishment are the personal pleasures derived from eating.
The Challenge of Gastronomic Hedonism
Gastronomic hedonism is by all means the most widespread underlying philosophical attitude we take towards food. What motivates our eating is pleasure. Or, well, first and foremost there is hunger; but, hunger can be satisfied with a bent towards pleasure.
The fact that it is widespread, however, does not render gastronomic hedonism more ethically legitimate. Prejudice and error are most common too. Indeed, philosophers such as Platohave condemned gastronomic hedonism: if your goal is to gain insight into the most profound human affairs, you shall not rejoice in the pleasures for the senses; those cannot but be a distraction from more the highest form of truth.
As Descartes showed in the second of his Meditations on First Philosophy, we do come to understand what a piece of wax is not through the senses: those teach us that wax is cold, hard, and round; but then you place it next to the fire and, although the wax remains the same, it appears to the senses completely different – warm, soft, and flat. Only the intellect is capable of grasping that the wax can stay the same throughout change, and only the intellect is capable of grasping the infinite possible changes that a single piece of wax could undergo.
Food is no different under these respects: if you were to try and guess the calories of a food by its taste, you would be fooled all the times; if you were to use your senses to understand whether a food is poisonous, you would be long dead. There is no reliable knowledge that can be achieved through the sensual pleasures of food.
Gastronomic hedonism is by all means the most widespread underlying philosophical attitude we take towards food. What motivates our eating is pleasure. Or, well, first and foremost there is hunger; but, hunger can be satisfied with a bent towards pleasure.
The fact that it is widespread, however, does not render gastronomic hedonism more ethically legitimate. Prejudice and error are most common too. Indeed, philosophers such as Platohave condemned gastronomic hedonism: if your goal is to gain insight into the most profound human affairs, you shall not rejoice in the pleasures for the senses; those cannot but be a distraction from more the highest form of truth.
As Descartes showed in the second of his Meditations on First Philosophy, we do come to understand what a piece of wax is not through the senses: those teach us that wax is cold, hard, and round; but then you place it next to the fire and, although the wax remains the same, it appears to the senses completely different – warm, soft, and flat. Only the intellect is capable of grasping that the wax can stay the same throughout change, and only the intellect is capable of grasping the infinite possible changes that a single piece of wax could undergo.
Food is no different under these respects: if you were to try and guess the calories of a food by its taste, you would be fooled all the times; if you were to use your senses to understand whether a food is poisonous, you would be long dead. There is no reliable knowledge that can be achieved through the sensual pleasures of food.
Pleasure Comeback?
An yet, aren’t aesthetic experiences capable of converting us to better ethical standards or even to the quest for truth? In the movie Babette’s Feast, Babette uplifts the lost ethical standards of a small religious community by preparing a memorable dinner. In the same way that visual art or music have been seen as capable of redeeming the evil we find in the world, couldn’t food be the art of the twenty-first century?
An yet, aren’t aesthetic experiences capable of converting us to better ethical standards or even to the quest for truth? In the movie Babette’s Feast, Babette uplifts the lost ethical standards of a small religious community by preparing a memorable dinner. In the same way that visual art or music have been seen as capable of redeeming the evil we find in the world, couldn’t food be the art of the twenty-first century?
Artículo tomado de:
http://philosophy.about.com/od/Philosophy-Now/a/Gastronomic-Hedonism.htm
¿El hedonismo se reduce al ámbito filosófico?
Preguntas que orientan nuestra búsqueda para localizar un texto en la web
- ¿Es posible una postura hedonista fuera del ámbito de la filosofía?
- ¿Es posible una postura hedonista fuera del ámbito de la filosofía?
- ¿El hedonismo fuera de la postura filosófica puede volverse un hedonismo vulgar?
- ¿Podemos relacionar al hedonismo con actividades tan cotidianas como comer, dormir, conversar, etc?
- ¿Es en las cosas mas simples en donde encontramos placer?
viernes, 4 de octubre de 2013
What Is Animal Liberation? Excerpts From Philosopher Peter Singer's Groundbreaking Work
“Animal Liberation” may sound more like a parody of other liberation movements than a serious objective. The idea of “The Rights of Animals” actually was once used to parody the case for women's rights. When Mary Wollstonecraft published herVindication of the Rights of Women in 1792, her views were widely regarded as absurd, and before long, an anonymous publication appeared entitled A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes. The author of this satirical work (now known to have been Thomas Taylor, a distinguished Cambridge philosopher) tried to refute Mary Wollstonecraft's arguments by showing that they could be carried one stage further. If the argument for equality was sound when applied to women, why should it not be applied to dogs, cats, and horses? …
When we say that all human beings, whatever their race, creed, or sex, are equal, what is it that we are asserting? Like it or not, we must face the fact that humans come in different shapes and sizes; they come with different moral capacities, different intellectual abilities, different amounts of benevolent feeling and sensitivity to the needs of others, different abilities to communicate effectively, and different capacities to experience pleasure and pain. In short, if the demand for equality were based on the actual equality of all human beings, we would have to stop demanding equality. …
The existence of individual variations that cut across the lines of race or sex, however, provides us with no defense at all against a more sophisticated opponent of equality, one who proposes that, say, the interests of all those with IQ scores below 100 be given less consideration than the interests of those with ratings over 100. Perhaps those scoring below the mark would, in this society, be made the slaves of those scoring higher. Would a hierarchical society of this sort really be so much better than one based on race or sex? I think not. But if we tie the moral principle of equality to the factual equality of the different races or sexes, taken as a whole, our opposition to racism and sexism does not provide us with any basis for objecting to this kind of inegalitarianism. …
Fortunately, there is no need to pin the case for equality to one particular outcome of a scientific investigation. … There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to their needs and interests. The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: It is a prescription of how we should treat human beings.
Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the reforming utilitarian school of moral philosophy, incorporated the essential basis of moral equality into his system of ethics by means of the formula: “Each to count for one and none for more than one.” In other words, the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being. …
It is an implication of this principle of equality that our concern for others and our readiness to consider their interests ought not to depend on what they are like or on what abilities they may possess. Precisely what our concern or consideration requires us to do may vary according to the characteristics of those affected by what we do: concern for the well-being of children growing up in America would require that we teach them to read; concern for the well-being of pigs may require no more than that we leave them with other pigs in a place where there is adequate food and room to run freely. But the basic element—the taking into account of the interests of the being, whatever those interests may be—must, according to the principle of equality, be extended to all beings, black or white, masculine or feminine, human or nonhuman.
Thomas Jefferson, who was responsible for writing the principle of the equality of men into the American Declaration of Independence, saw this point. It led him to oppose slavery even though he was unable to free himself fully from his slaveholding background. He wrote in a letter to the author of a book that emphasized the notable intellectual achievements of Negroes in order to refute the then common view that they have limited intellectual capacities: “Be assured that no person living wishes more sincerely than I do, to see a complete refutation of the doubts I myself have entertained and expressed on the grade of understanding allotted to them by nature, and to find that they are on a par with ourselves … but whatever be their degree of talent it is no measure of their rights. Because Sir Isaac Newton was superior to others in understanding, he was not therefore lord of the property or person of others.”
Similarly, when in the 1850s the call for women's rights was raised in the United States, a remarkable black feminist named Sojourner Truth made the same point in more robust terms at a feminist convention: “They talk about this thing in the head; what do they call it? [“Intellect,” whispered someone nearby.] That's it. What's that got to do with women's rights or Negroes' rights? If my cup won't hold but a pint and yours holds a quart, wouldn't you be mean not to let me have my little half-measure full?”
It is on this basis that the case against racism and the case against sexism must both ultimately rest; and it is in accordance with this principle that the attitude that we may call “speciesism,” by analogy with racism, must also be condemned. Speciesism—the word is not an attractive one, but I can think of no better term—is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species. It should be obvious that the fundamental objections to racism and sexism made by Thomas Jefferson and Sojourner Truth apply equally to speciesism. If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his or her own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the same purpose?
Many philosophers and other writers have proposed the principle of equal consideration of interests, in some form or other, as a basic moral principle; but not many of them have recognized that this principle applies to members of other species as well as to our own. Jeremy Bentham was one of the few who did realize this. In a forward-looking passage written at a time when black slaves had been freed by the French but in the British dominions were still being treated in the way we now treat animals, Bentham wrote:
“The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”
In this passage, Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as the vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration. … If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that [his or her] suffering be counted equally with the like suffering—insofar as rough comparisons can be made—of any other being. …
Racists violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of their own race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Sexists violate the principle of equality by favoring the interests of their own sex. Similarly, speciesists allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is identical in each case.
Most human beings are speciesists. … [O]rdinary human beings—not a few exceptionally cruel or heartless humans, but the overwhelming majority of humans—take an active part in, acquiesce in, and allow their taxes to pay for practices that require the sacrifice of the most important interests of members of other species in order to promote the most trivial interests of our own species.…
Even if we were to prevent the infliction of suffering on animals only when it is quite certain that the interests of humans will not be affected to anything like the extent that animals are affected, we would be forced to make radical changes in our treatment of animals that would involve our diet, the farming methods we use, experimental procedures in many fields of science, our approach to wildlife and to hunting, trapping and the wearing of furs, and areas of entertainment like circuses, rodeos, and zoos. As a result, a vast amount of suffering would be avoided.
When we say that all human beings, whatever their race, creed, or sex, are equal, what is it that we are asserting? Like it or not, we must face the fact that humans come in different shapes and sizes; they come with different moral capacities, different intellectual abilities, different amounts of benevolent feeling and sensitivity to the needs of others, different abilities to communicate effectively, and different capacities to experience pleasure and pain. In short, if the demand for equality were based on the actual equality of all human beings, we would have to stop demanding equality. …
The existence of individual variations that cut across the lines of race or sex, however, provides us with no defense at all against a more sophisticated opponent of equality, one who proposes that, say, the interests of all those with IQ scores below 100 be given less consideration than the interests of those with ratings over 100. Perhaps those scoring below the mark would, in this society, be made the slaves of those scoring higher. Would a hierarchical society of this sort really be so much better than one based on race or sex? I think not. But if we tie the moral principle of equality to the factual equality of the different races or sexes, taken as a whole, our opposition to racism and sexism does not provide us with any basis for objecting to this kind of inegalitarianism. …
Fortunately, there is no need to pin the case for equality to one particular outcome of a scientific investigation. … There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to their needs and interests. The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: It is a prescription of how we should treat human beings.
Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the reforming utilitarian school of moral philosophy, incorporated the essential basis of moral equality into his system of ethics by means of the formula: “Each to count for one and none for more than one.” In other words, the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being. …
It is an implication of this principle of equality that our concern for others and our readiness to consider their interests ought not to depend on what they are like or on what abilities they may possess. Precisely what our concern or consideration requires us to do may vary according to the characteristics of those affected by what we do: concern for the well-being of children growing up in America would require that we teach them to read; concern for the well-being of pigs may require no more than that we leave them with other pigs in a place where there is adequate food and room to run freely. But the basic element—the taking into account of the interests of the being, whatever those interests may be—must, according to the principle of equality, be extended to all beings, black or white, masculine or feminine, human or nonhuman.
Thomas Jefferson, who was responsible for writing the principle of the equality of men into the American Declaration of Independence, saw this point. It led him to oppose slavery even though he was unable to free himself fully from his slaveholding background. He wrote in a letter to the author of a book that emphasized the notable intellectual achievements of Negroes in order to refute the then common view that they have limited intellectual capacities: “Be assured that no person living wishes more sincerely than I do, to see a complete refutation of the doubts I myself have entertained and expressed on the grade of understanding allotted to them by nature, and to find that they are on a par with ourselves … but whatever be their degree of talent it is no measure of their rights. Because Sir Isaac Newton was superior to others in understanding, he was not therefore lord of the property or person of others.”
Similarly, when in the 1850s the call for women's rights was raised in the United States, a remarkable black feminist named Sojourner Truth made the same point in more robust terms at a feminist convention: “They talk about this thing in the head; what do they call it? [“Intellect,” whispered someone nearby.] That's it. What's that got to do with women's rights or Negroes' rights? If my cup won't hold but a pint and yours holds a quart, wouldn't you be mean not to let me have my little half-measure full?”
It is on this basis that the case against racism and the case against sexism must both ultimately rest; and it is in accordance with this principle that the attitude that we may call “speciesism,” by analogy with racism, must also be condemned. Speciesism—the word is not an attractive one, but I can think of no better term—is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species. It should be obvious that the fundamental objections to racism and sexism made by Thomas Jefferson and Sojourner Truth apply equally to speciesism. If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his or her own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the same purpose?
Many philosophers and other writers have proposed the principle of equal consideration of interests, in some form or other, as a basic moral principle; but not many of them have recognized that this principle applies to members of other species as well as to our own. Jeremy Bentham was one of the few who did realize this. In a forward-looking passage written at a time when black slaves had been freed by the French but in the British dominions were still being treated in the way we now treat animals, Bentham wrote:
“The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”
In this passage, Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as the vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration. … If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that [his or her] suffering be counted equally with the like suffering—insofar as rough comparisons can be made—of any other being. …
Racists violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of their own race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Sexists violate the principle of equality by favoring the interests of their own sex. Similarly, speciesists allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is identical in each case.
Most human beings are speciesists. … [O]rdinary human beings—not a few exceptionally cruel or heartless humans, but the overwhelming majority of humans—take an active part in, acquiesce in, and allow their taxes to pay for practices that require the sacrifice of the most important interests of members of other species in order to promote the most trivial interests of our own species.…
Even if we were to prevent the infliction of suffering on animals only when it is quite certain that the interests of humans will not be affected to anything like the extent that animals are affected, we would be forced to make radical changes in our treatment of animals that would involve our diet, the farming methods we use, experimental procedures in many fields of science, our approach to wildlife and to hunting, trapping and the wearing of furs, and areas of entertainment like circuses, rodeos, and zoos. As a result, a vast amount of suffering would be avoided.
Puede sufrir?
"un caballo que ha alcanzado la madurez o un perro es, más allá de cualquier comparación, un animal más sociable y razonable que un recién nacido de un día, de una semana o incluso de un mes. Supongamos, sin embargo, que no sea así. La pregunta no es ¿pueden razonar? sino ¿pueden sufrir?"
Peter SingerEjercicio para abordar el texto
a- Utilizando skanning
1- Enumera cuales son las corrientes de la filosofía que adhieren al hedonismo.
2- Resalta los nombres de filósofos que aparecen.
3- Subraya las ciudades, localidades o países que aparecen en el texto.
b- Utilizando Skimming
1- ¿Cuál es la tesis centra del hedonismo?
2- ¿Cual es la época en que se ubica cada corriente?
3-¿Como define Onfray al hedonismo?
a-1
- The cyrenaic school
- Epicureanism
- Mohism
- Utilitarianism
- Criticisms
b-1
Hedonism is a school of thought that argues that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. In very simple terms, a hedonist strives to maximize net pleasure (pleasure minuspain)
b-2
- The cyrenaic school 4th centuru BCE
- Epicureanism around 307 BC
- Mohism 5th century BCE
- Utilitarianism The 18th and 19th-century
- Criticisms the contemporary
b-3
Como "as an introspective attitude to life based on taking pleasure yourself and pleasuring others, without harming yourself or anyone else"
Hedonism is a school of thought that argues that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. In very simple terms, a hedonist strives to maximize net pleasure (pleasure minuspain)
b-2
- The cyrenaic school 4th centuru BCE
- Epicureanism around 307 BC
- Mohism 5th century BCE
- Utilitarianism The 18th and 19th-century
- Criticisms the contemporary
b-3
Como "as an introspective attitude to life based on taking pleasure yourself and pleasuring others, without harming yourself or anyone else"
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